# INTERMEDIATE MACROECONOMICS

#### **LECTURE 2**

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# THEORY OF MACRO

#### THE WALRASIAN PARADIGM

- A **Walrasian** market is one in which producers and consumers are price takers
- This is reasonable for buying a quart of milk, but probably not so much for, say, buying wind turbines from GE
- Consumers and producers make certain decisions after seeing these prices (supply and demand)
- An equilibrium is a situation where prices are such that the market clears, i.e., supply equals demand

### **CONSUMER OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM**

- A consumer has a utility function u(c<sub>1</sub>, c<sub>2</sub>) which gives a utility value for each (c<sub>1</sub>, c<sub>2</sub>) combination
- Given market prices p<sub>1</sub> and p<sub>2</sub>, the optimal choice should then be given by

 $\max_{c_1,c_2} u(c_1,c_2)$ subj. to  $p_1c_1 + p_2c_2 = p_1e_1 + p_2e_2$ 

#### LAGRANGIAN TECHNIQUES

- We want to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, which says that we must spend less than our wealth
- To do this, we introduce a number (λ) called the Lagrange multiplier and define the Lagrangian

$$\mathcal{L} = u(c_1, c_2) - \lambda(p_1c_1 + p_2c_2 - p_1e_1 - p_2e_2)$$

- Think of this as the cost of spending more than you have
- For any given choice of  $\lambda > 0$ , we get values for  $(c_1, c_2)$

#### FINDING THE OPTIMUM

To maximize *L* for a given λ value, we take the derivative with respect to c<sub>1</sub> and c<sub>2</sub>

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_1} = u_1(c_1, c_2) - \lambda p_1 = 0$$
$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_2} = u_2(c_1, c_2) - \lambda p_2 = 0$$

• Independent of  $\lambda$ , these two equations imply

(MRS) 
$$\frac{u_1(c_1, c_2)}{u_2(c_1, c_2)} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$$
 (Price Ratio)

#### LAGRANGE MULTIPLIER

- When  $\lambda = 0$ , we would choose  $c_1 = c_2 = \infty$
- When  $\lambda = \infty$ , we would choose  $c_1 = c_2 = 0$
- In-between, there should be some  $\lambda^*$  where the budget constraint is satisfied

$$p_1c_1(\lambda^*) + p_2c_2(\lambda^*) = p_1e_1 + p_2e_2$$

 In practice, we can use budget equation and MRS condition to solve for c<sub>1</sub> and c<sub>2</sub>

#### **VISUALIZING THE OPTIMUM**

The MRS is the slope of the indifference curve and the price ratio is the slope of the budget line



#### **INDIFFERENCE AND SUBSTITUTION**

• An indifference curve is a set of points that a consumer is indifferent between

$$u(c_1, c_2) = u(c'_1, c'_2) = \bar{u}$$

• The Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) is also the slope of the indifference curve

$$\underbrace{u(c_1', c_2')}_{\bar{u}} \approx \underbrace{u(c_1, c_2)}_{\bar{u}} + \Delta c_1 \cdot u_1 + \Delta c_2 \cdot u_2$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad \frac{\Delta c_2}{\Delta c_1} = -\frac{u_1}{u_2} = -MRS$$

#### **INTUITIVE APPROACH**

• There is a way to do this without Lagrange by substituting the budget constraint

$$v(c_1) = u\left(c_1, \frac{p_1e_1 + p_2e_2 - p_1c_1}{p_2}\right)$$

• Maximizing this function with respect to  $c_2$  yields

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial c_1} = u_1(c_1, c_2) - u_2(c_1, c_2) \cdot \left(\frac{p_1}{p_2}\right) = 0$$

• Rearranging we find the same MRS condition

#### **BRIEF EXAMPLE**

• Suppose that the consumer's utility function is

$$u(c_1, c_2) = \log(c_1) + \log(c_2)$$

• The MRS condition is then simply

$$\frac{c_2}{c_1} = \frac{p_1}{p_2} \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad p_1 c_1 = p_2 c_2$$

• Adding in the budget constraint determines our consumption exactly

$$c_1 = \frac{p_1 e_1 + p_2 e_2}{2p_1} \qquad c_2 = \frac{p_1 e_1 + p_2 e_2}{2p_2}$$

#### AN EXCHANGE ECONOMY

- Here we have only two consumers and two goods to keep things simple
- This is an exchange economy: there are no producers, just some goods lying around
- Each consumer *i* starts with  $e_1^i$  of good 1 and  $e_2^i$  of good two
- Consumers can go to the market and buy or sell as much of each good as they wish
- Let  $c_1^i$  and  $c_2^i$  be what they end up with

#### **EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS**

- Consumers take prices p<sub>1</sub> and p<sub>2</sub> as given and maximize as we have seen
- There are also **market clearing** constraints, ensuring all goods are consumed

$$c_1^1 + c_1^2 = e_1^1 + e_1^2$$
 (Good 1)  
 $c_2^1 + c_2^2 = e_2^1 + e_2^2$  (Good 2)

#### **PRICE DETERMINATION**

- From the consumer maximization, we know that given  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , we can find  $(c_1^1, c_2^1)$  and  $(c_1^2, c_2^2)$
- For random guesses of these prices, it might be that consumers are consuming too much or too little of each good, so our market clearing conditions don't hold
- As with Lagrange multiplier, there should be certain values  $p_1^\ast$  and  $p_2^\ast$  such that

$$c_1^1(p_1^*, p_2^*) + c_1^2(p_1^*, p_2^*) = e_1^1 + e_1^2$$
  
$$c_2^1(p_1^*, p_2^*) + c_2^2(p_1^*, p_2^*) = e_2^1 + e_2^2$$

#### **EDGEWORTH BOX**



#### **PROPERTIES OF AN EQUILIBRIUM**

- Because the the MRS of each consumer is equal to the price ratio, they are equal to each other:  $MRS_1 = MRS_2$
- It turns out that this is the same condition that ensures Pareto efficiency, thus our equilibrium is efficient
- This result is known as the **First Basic Welfare Theorem** and can be proven in more general settings as well (many goods and many consumers)

#### ADDING A MACRO FLAVOR

- One of the most important choices that determines macro outcomes is that between consumption and leisure
- Here leisure is defined simply as time not spend working
- Working more means you make more money with which to buy goods, but less leisure time
- There can be interactions: being wealthier can make leisure time more enjoyable
- We model this as a continuous choice, but in reality it is often not continuous or a choice

#### THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

- Now instead of two generic goods, we will have consumption and leisure enter into our utility function u(c, ℓ)
- Time here is expressed as a fraction between 0 and 1 of the day, month, year, etc.
- Consumers spend a certain fraction of their time *h* working at wage *w*, so wage income is *w* · *h*
- The also have capital gains (from firm profits/dividends)  $\pi$  and pay taxes T to the government

#### **CONSUMPTION-LEISURE CHOICE**

• Now the budget constraint for the consumer is

$$c = wh + \pi - T$$

• By assumption, leisure time is that not spent working, so  $h = 1 - \ell$ , meaning

$$c + w\ell = (\pi - T) + w$$

• This is equivalent to the generic case with

$$p_c = 1$$
 and  $e_c = \pi - T$   
 $p_{\ell} = w$   $e_{\ell} = 1$ 

#### **OPTIMAL HOURS CHOICE**

• Avoiding Lagrange multipliers, we can set this up as

$$v(h) = u(wh + \pi - T, 1 - h)$$

• Taking the derivative we find

$$\frac{\partial v}{\partial h} = w u_c(c, \ell) - u_\ell(c, \ell) = 0$$
  

$$\Rightarrow \quad \frac{u_\ell(c, \ell)}{u_c(c, \ell)} = w$$

• This is the same MRS condition that we derived before

#### **GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION**

MRS is the slope of the indifference curve. Wage (w) is the slope of the budget set.



#### HOW DO CONSUMERS RESPOND?

- One important question to consider is how consumers respond to changes in: wages (w), taxes (T), and profits (π).
   Sometimes called comparative statics
- Because taxes and profits only affect wealth, they will produce similar and unambiguous responses
- We will generally assume that both consumption and leisure are **normal goods**, meaning you consume more of them when your wealth increases

#### **CHANGES IN WEALTH**

Both consumption and leisure rise when T falls or  $\pi$  rises



#### **CHANGES IN WAGE**

Here we see both a wealth effect  $(F \rightarrow O)$  and a substitution effect  $(O \rightarrow H)$  when wage rises



#### A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE

• Let the utility function of the consumer be of the **Cobb**-**Douglas** form

$$u(c, \ell) = \log(c) + \eta \log(\ell)$$

- The parameter η measures how much this person values leisure, called Frisch elasticity
- Satisfies Inada condition: marginal utility at c = 0 or  $\ell = 0$  is infinity  $\rightarrow$  will always consume at least a small amount
- Same budget constraint as before

$$c = wh + \pi - T$$

#### **FINDING THE OPTIMUM**

• Simplifies to a choice of hours

$$v(h) = \log(wh + \pi - T) + \eta \log(1 - h)$$

• Taking the derivative yields

$$0 = \frac{w}{wh + \pi - T} - \frac{\eta}{1 - h} \implies h = \frac{1}{1 + \eta} - \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \left(\frac{\pi - T}{w}\right)$$

• Now we can solve for the consumption and leisure too

$$c = \left(\frac{1}{1+\eta}\right)(w+\pi-T) \quad \mathscr{C} = \left(\frac{\eta}{1+\eta}\right)\frac{w+\pi-T}{w}$$

#### **IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS**

- If  $w \leq \eta(\pi T)$ , the worker chooses h = 0
- In this setting, hours worked increases with the wage (and leisure consequently decreases)
- As predicted, both consumption and leisure increase with base income ( $\pi T$ )
- When base income is zero, hours worked is constant,  $1/(1 + \eta)$ , and invariant to wage!
- When might we expect hours to be decreasing with wage?

#### ALTERNATIVE TAX REGIMES

- Most taxes we see in the wild are proportional rather than lump-sum
- Consider a consumption (sales) tax  $au_c$  and a labor (income) tax  $au_h$

$$c = wh + \pi - \tau_c c - \tau_h wh$$

• Now our utility of working *h* is expressed as

$$v(h) = u\left(\frac{(1-\tau_w)wh+\pi}{1+\tau_c}, 1-h\right)$$

#### **PROPORTIONAL TAX OPTIMUM**

• The optimal choice will then satisfy

$$\frac{dv}{dh} = u_c(c, \ell) \left(\frac{1 - \tau_w}{1 + \tau_c}\right) w - u_\ell(c, \ell) = 0$$

• Rearranging we find

$$MRS = \frac{u_{\ell}(c, \ell)}{u_{c}(c, \ell)} = \left(\frac{1 - \tau_{w}}{1 + \tau_{c}}\right)w$$

• The proportional taxes act the same as changing the wage directly (income and substitution effect)

#### **BACK TO COBB-DOUGLAS**

• Returning to our specific example, we find

$$v(h) = \log\left[\frac{(1-\tau_w)wh + \pi}{1+\tau_c}\right] + \eta\log(1-h)$$

• Consumption tax  $\tau_c$  has no effect! Just scales down consumption. Wage tax  $\tau_w$  same as wage w

$$h = \frac{1}{1+\eta} - \frac{\eta}{1+\eta} \left[ \frac{\pi}{(1-\tau_w)w} \right]$$

#### MAPPING TO THE AGGREGATE

- Final conceptual leap is to proclaim this the representative consumer
- Imagine an economy populated with identical replicas of this person
- Aggregate outcomes the same as individual choices
- Each agent is so small, he or she exerts no market power → Walrasian assumptions hold

## THE PRODUCTION SIDE

- Consumers are on the demand side for consumption and the supply side for labor
- Now we introduce producers to serve the opposing roles: supply side for consumption and demand side for labor
- Producers have no utility, we assume for now that they act to maximize profits (an approximation of US law, fiduciary duty)

#### **ARCHITECTURE OF A FIRM**

- Firms take **capital** *k* and labor *h* as inputs and output a consumption good *y*
- Think of a firm as being characterized by a production function

$$y = z \cdot f(k, h)$$

• The term *z* is called **total factor productivity** and denotes the total level of output capacity

#### WHAT IS CAPITAL?

- Any persistent (durable) machine that is used in the course of production
- Harvester on a farm, tools in a factory, computers in services
- Closely linked with **investment** because we must forgo consumption to make capital
- There is also **intangible capital** like inventions, designs, brands, trademarks, etc, which operates similarly

### PROPERTIES OF PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS

- **Returns to scale**: how does doubling all inputs (capital and labor) affect output?
- Decreasing returns:  $f(x \cdot k, x \cdot h) < x \cdot f(k, h)$
- Constant returns:  $f(x \cdot k, x \cdot h) = x \cdot f(k, h)$
- Increasing returns:  $f(x \cdot k, x \cdot h) > x \cdot f(k, h)$
- All are potentially interesting, though we will generally focus on constant returns

#### **CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE**

- Important to consider the level of aggregation, returns to scale are not necessarily invariant
- Suppose we can build an auto plant for \$10 million and each car costs \$10,000 to make
- Building 100 cars costs \$11 million, while building 200 cars costs \$12 million < \$22 million (increasing returns)
- However, simply building two plants and doubling the number of cars produced **is** constant returns

#### NON-CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE

- Increasing and decreasing returns to scale generally involve some sort of **externality**
- Increasing: at the city level, it is plausible to believe that being in a larger city can enhance the productivity of certain types of workers → agglomeration
- Decreasing: conversely, there is also the possibility of clogged roads, noise, or litter → congestion
- At the national or global level, the presence of a shared knowledge pool can induce increasing returns

#### **PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM**

- Given a certain amount of capital k, a firm hires workers h at wage w
- You can think about *h* as a total number of workers or hours
- With output price 1, the total profit of a firm is then

$$\pi(h) = zf(k,h) - wh$$

• Taking the derivative, the optimality condition is then

$$MPL = zf_h(k, h) = w$$

#### **VISUALIZING THE OPTIMUM**

The firm hires workers until the marginal product of an additional work is equal to the wage



#### **PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMUM**

- For this to work, we need to have  $f_{hh} < 0$ , decreasing returns, at least eventually
- How does optimal choice  $h^*$  change with z, k, w?
- Given  $zf_h(k, h^*(k)) = w$ , we can derive  $z\left[f_{kh} + f_{hh}\frac{dh^*}{dk}\right] = 0 \implies \frac{dh^*}{dk} = -\frac{f_{kh}}{f_{hh}} > 0$
- We generally assume that more capital raises the marginal product of labor (MPL), i.e.,  $f_{kh} > 0$

#### FIXED COSTS OF PRODUCTION

• With fixed cost *C*, profit is then

$$\pi = zf(k,h) - wh - C$$

- Calculus is the same as before, but we need to check whether production is "worth it"
- Let  $h^*$  be the optimal choice satisfying  $zf(k, h^*) = w$
- Do we have

$$zf(k,h^*) - wh^* > C \quad ?$$

#### **SPECIFIC PRODUCTION EXAMPLE**

• Once again we will use a Cobb-Douglas function

$$y = zk^{\alpha}h^{1-\alpha}$$

• You can verify that this satisfies  $f_{kk} < 0, f_{hh} < 0$ , and  $f_{kh} > 0$ . The marginal product of labor is then

$$zf_h = (1 - \alpha)zk^{\alpha}h^{-\alpha} = (1 - \alpha)z\left(\frac{k}{h}\right)^{\alpha}$$

#### **PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL LABOR**

• Using  $zf_h = w$ , we then find the optimal choice of labor

$$h^* = \left[\frac{(1-\alpha)z}{w}\right]^{1/\alpha}k$$

- Notice that the optimal choice involves targeting a certain ratio of labor to capital. If we all the sudden got more capital, we would hire proportionately more workers
- Total output is computed to be

$$y^* = z^{1/\alpha} \left[ \frac{1-\alpha}{w} \right]^{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}} k$$

#### LABOR SHARE OF INCOME

 Notice that with Cobb-Douglas, the ratio of labor income to output is

$$\frac{wh}{y} = \frac{f_h h}{y} = 1 - \alpha$$

- Looking at this in the data we find that in the US, it is quite stable at around 70%, meaning  $\alpha=30\%$
- This was actually the impetus for Paul Douglas proposing this functional form
- In some developing countries and more recently in US, labor share has been decreasing slightly

#### LABOR SHARE OVER TIME

The labor share in the US has been roughly constant over time



#### LABOR SHARE INTERNATIONALLY

Internationally labor share has decreased, some substantially



#### SOLOW RESIDUAL

• This measure is named after Robert Solow, and is given by

$$\hat{z} = \frac{y}{k^{\alpha} h^{1-\alpha}}$$

- The underlying idea is that real GDP combines productivity and investments in capital and labor, while this looks only at the former
- We'll look at better ways to measure this and theories regarding its evolution later in the course

#### **GROWTH IN TFP**

Can use observations of *y*, *k*, and *h* to estimate TFP (*z*)



#### **INTERNATIONAL TPF LEVELS**

Can see whether growth from TFP or factor accumulation



#### **CAPITAL INVESTMENT**

#### Investment also an important driver of output



#### **MOVING FORWARD**

- The next step is to declare this firm the **representative firm** and fuse the consumer and producer work we've done into a full-blown economy
- With this, we can start discussing the determination of wages/prices and allocations
- We can also talk about efficiency and the effects of policy
- Ultimately, we'll want to include capital investment choices and TFP growth

#### AGGREGATE ACCOUNTING

- We will assume that the government has a balanced budget so that G = T
- Combining the consumption and production side, our GDP identities hold

$$c = wh + \pi - T = wh + \pi - G$$
  

$$\pi = zf(k, h) - wh = y - wh$$
  

$$\Rightarrow \quad y = c + G$$
  

$$w I = 0 \text{ and } NY = 0$$

• Here we have I = 0 and NX = 0

### **EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS**

• Combining optimality conditions, we find

$$MRS = w = MPL$$
$$\frac{u_{\ell}(c, \ell)}{u_{c}(c, \ell)} = w = zf_{h}(k, h)$$

• Combined with c + G = zf(k, h) and  $\ell + h = 1$ , we can fully determine the equilibrium

#### **COBB-DOUGLAS EXAMPLE**

• Recalling our previous derivations, we have

$$MRS = \frac{\eta c}{\ell} = w = \frac{(1 - \alpha)y}{h} = MPL$$
$$\Rightarrow \quad \frac{\eta(y(h) - G)}{1 - h} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)y(h)}{h}$$

• This is difficult to solve, but when G = 0 we get

$$h = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\eta + 1 - \alpha}$$

#### **VISUALIZING THE EQUILIBRIUM**

$$\eta = 1, \alpha = 0.3, G = 0.1$$



#### **IS THIS EFFICIENT?**

- To determine if this outcome is efficient, consider a social planner who decides the outcome
- Planner chooses *h*, which determines *y*, *c*, *l*, and hence utility
- Objective is to maximize agents utility. Could also think of this as agent owning the factory

$$u(h) = u(zf(k,h) - G, 1 - h)$$

• We still take government spending as given, necessary basic spending

#### SOCIAL PLANNER'S OPTIMUM

• Taking the derivative, we find

$$u_c(c, \ell) \cdot zf(k, h) - u_\ell(c, \ell) = 0$$
  

$$\Rightarrow \quad \frac{u_c(c, \ell)}{u_\ell(c, \ell)} = zf(k, h)$$

- The same condition we saw in the equilibrium! So this is the efficient outcome
- Notice that we haven't made any statements about the efficient level of *G*

#### **EFFECT OF CHANGING G**

Pure income effect  $\rightarrow$  both c and  $\ell$  fall



#### **EFFECT OF CHANGING Z**

Both income and substitution  $\rightarrow$  change in  $\ell$  ambiguous



#### **INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS**

- Change in *G* is same story as change in *T* on consumer side
- Change in TDP (z) similar to change in w on consumer side
- These forces are candidates drivers for short-term economic fluctuations
- The question is whether they can be treated as **exogenous** factors and how well they correlate with changes in GDP
- If they do correlate, does that imply causality?

#### **TFP AS DRIVER?**

Trouble is that TFP is measured from GDP

![](_page_60_Figure_2.jpeg)